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Abstract
This paper claims that relational position and group-based distinctions are 
less important in determining the rights of animals than Zoopolis concludes. 
In particular, it argues that the theory of animal rights developed in Zoopolis 
is vulnerable to some of the critiques that are made against theories which 
differentiate the rights of humans on the basis of group-based distinctions. 
For example, in the human context, group-differentiated theories of rights 
have been criticised on a number of important grounds: for failing to extend 
to non-associates rights that ought to be so extended; for granting too much 
weight to the rights of associates over non-associates; for wrongly treating 
groups as homogenous entities; and for also assuming that these groups 
necessarily have value as they exist presently. This paper outlines how modi-
fied versions of these critiques can be levelled at the theory of animal rights 
defended in Zoopolis.
Keywords: animals, animal rights, universal rights, group-differentiated 
rights, relational position, cosmopolitanism, capacities, interests.
1. INTRODUCTION
In their fascinating and thought-provoking new book, Zoopolis, Sue Donald-
son and Will Kymlicka aim to construct a distinctively political theory of ani-
mal rights. Zoopolis seeks to employ familiar concepts from political theory 
and practice in order to “supplement” and “extend” so-called “traditional 
theories” of animal rights (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011: 50). It argues that 
* For writing such a thoughtful, imaginative and progressive book on behalf of animals, 
special thanks to Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka. I would also like to thank all of the editors 
and reviewers at LEAP for their extensive and helpful feedback —with particular thanks owed 
to Paula Casal. Finally, thanks to all of the following people who helped me shape the paper 
after extensive discussion of Zoopolis: Garrett Brown, Steve Cooke, Robert Garner, John Hadley, 
Oscar Horta, Siobhan O’Sullivan and Krithika Srinavasan.
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while traditional theories have provided a plausible basis for attributing uni-
versal moral rights to sentient animals based on their intrinsic character-
istics, they have failed to capture the variety of duties we have to animals 
stemming from the very different types of relationships we have with them 
(6). The book aims to remedy this fault through employing a theory of group-
differentiated animal rights that takes animals’ relational position seriously.
Zoopolis employs three concepts from political theory and practice to 
help determine what is owed to different groups of animals. “Citizenship” 
should be granted to all domesticated animals on the basis that they are full 
members of mixed human-animal communities, participating in the coop-
erative project of political life. “Sovereignty”, by contrast, should be granted 
to those wild animals who live apart from humans, on the basis that they 
are competent to run their own affairs, and seem not to desire intervention. 
Finally, “denizenship” should be granted to those “liminal” animals who are 
wild but live in the midst of human settlements (such as crows or mice), on 
the basis that they reside within our societies, but lack the reciprocal capaci-
ties necessary to be regarded as joint co-operators (Ch. 1).
Developing a theory of animal rights that is subtle, nuanced and attuned 
to the differences between animals is certainly commendable. Moreover, a 
theory which is alive to the political importance of animal rights is an ex-
tremely welcome contribution to animal ethics. It is important, however, not 
to overstate the novelty of a “political approach” to the question of what is 
owed to animals. Previous discussions of animal rights have also been po-
litical: they have employed political concepts and have offered prescriptions 
that the state ought to enforce coercively. The novelty of Zoopolis resides not 
so much in connecting animal ethics to political theory, but connecting it to 
a particular position in political theory: a position which grants consider-
able weight to group membership and relational position when determin-
ing an individual’s proper entitlements. Traditional theories of animal rights 
as espoused by such thinkers as Tom Regan and Peter Singer, on the other 
hand, have very much been cosmopolitan in character: sceptical about the 
moral relevance of group-based distinctions, and instead focused on the 
equal universal entitlements derived from the interests and capacities of in-
dividuals (Singer 1995; Regan 2004). When evaluating the theory of Zoopolis, 
then, the question is not whether a political theory of animal rights makes 
sense. Rather, the appropriate question is whether a political theory which 
gives such important weight to the relational and group-based distinctions 
of animals makes sense.
This paper claims that relational position and group-based distinctions 
are less important in determining the rights of animals than Donaldson and 
Kymlicka conclude. In particular, it claims that their theory is vulnerable to 
some of the critiques that are made against theories which differentiate the 
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rights of humans on the basis of group-based distinctions. For example, in 
the human context, group-differentiated theories of rights —such as that 
proposed by Kymlicka himself— have been criticised on a number of im-
portant grounds: for failing to extend to non-associates rights that ought to 
be so extended; for granting too much weight to the rights of associates over 
non-associates; and for both wrongly treating groups as homogenous enti-
ties, and for also assuming that these groups necessarily have value as they 
exist presently.1 The following three sections of this paper outline how modi-
fied versions of these critiques can be levelled at the theory of animal rights 
defended in Zoopolis. In each of them, the paper argues that while the rela-
tional position and group membership of animals can be of relevance in de-
termining their rights, it is not of primary importance. Instead, and in keep-
ing with more cosmopolitan traditions of political thought, the paper argues 
that it is the capacities of individual animals, and the interests that flow from 
those capacities, that is the most crucial factor in delineating their rights. 
The paper concludes by briefly exploring how a traditional theory of animal 
rights grounded in cosmopolitan political thought can still be attuned to the 
different types of duties we have towards animals.
2.  DENYING WILD ANIMALS THEIR JUST ENTITLEMENTS
Zoopolis recognises that all sentient animals possess certain universal moral 
rights, but argues that animals have further group-based rights on the basis 
of their different relational positions. Such a theory follows a familiar line of 
thinking in political theory. For example, David Miller famously proposes a 
theory of global justice which endorses the protection of minimal univer-
sal human rights for all, with further and more extensive rights and duties 
granted to individuals via their association within a nation-state (Miller 
2007). One potential problem faced by such theories, however, is that they 
can favour denying “outsider” groups —like foreigners— their just entitle-
ments by being too minimalist about the universal rights that are recognised 
(see e. g. Wenar 2008). Crucially, I believe that the theory of animal rights de-
fended in Zoopolis faces this problem. In particular, I am not convinced that 
the citizenship rights that Donaldson and Kymlicka grant to domesticated 
animals should not also be extended to all wild animals.
Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that citizenship contains three core ele-
ments, each of which entails a general right of citizenship that ought to ap-
1. For Kymlicka’s own theory of group-differentiated rights for humans, see Kymlicka 
(1995). For examples of critiques of theories of group-differentiated rights, see Wenar (2008: 
401-411), Kukathas (1992: 105-139), Waldron (1995: 93-119), Barry (2001), and Brown (2009: 
Ch. 4).
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ply to domesticated animals, but not to wild animals: the right to political 
concern, the right to political agency, and the right to residency (101). In 
their discussion of the practical implications of their theory, they also dis-
cuss further rights that are exclusive to domesticated animals, such as the 
right to be protected from predation (133-134). I want to claim that each of 
these rights can and ought to be granted to all sentient animals, including 
those in the wild.
Let us start then with the first general right of citizenship that Donaldson 
and Kymlicka identify: the right to political concern. This right means that 
domesticated animals —like other citizens— are entitled to have their inter-
ests included in the public good (101). In other words, it means that lawmak-
ers must consider the well-being of these creatures when formulating and 
implementing policies. However, it is unclear why this right is something 
that ought to be exclusive to domesticated animals. For one, Donaldson and 
Kymlicka themselves acknowledge that the interests of wild animals count 
for something —this, after all, is the basis on which they assign universal 
rights to them (Ch. 2). Moreover, it is also evident that the actions of human 
political communities affect those interests in profound ways. For example, 
some policies affect animals directly and explicitly, such as decisions to de-
velop areas of wilderness, “manage” wild populations, harvest fish from the 
ocean, and so on. Other policies affect wild animals more indirectly, such as 
decisions to burn fossil fuels, or to employ intensive agricultural methods.2 
Since the interests of wild animals are affected in extensive ways by the ac-
tions of political communities, and since those interests count morally for 
something, then it seems only right that political communities ought to in-
clude them in their policy deliberations.
Of course it might be objected that while political communities have an 
obligation to consider the interests of wild animals, that obligation is akin to 
the obligation we have to foreigners. That is to say, our obligations to respect 
basic human rights and offer aid in times of crisis are moral as opposed to 
political, grounded in a simple humanitarian duty to alleviate suffering, 
rather than in duties of justice which apply only within schemes of coop-
eration.3 However, I do not believe that this is the proper way to conceive 
of our obligations in respect of human rights and so I am extremely wary of 
extrapolating this model to the case of wild animals. By recognising that for-
eigners and wild animals have rights, we thereby recognise the existence of 
correlative duties that can coercively be enforced by the state (Steiner 2005: 
2. For a useful discussion of the ways in which our actions necessarily affect wild animals 
see Nussbaum (2006: 374).
3. For discussion of the difference between humanitarian duties and duties of justice see, 
Campbell (1974: 1-16), Caney (2005: 110-114), and Nagel (2005: 113-147).
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459-479, 460). In other words, the establishment of rights for those individ-
uals immediately makes their interests of political concern. Furthermore, 
acknowledging that foreigners and wild animals have rights which impose 
duties on our own communities necessarily involves recognising that their 
basic interests are of political concern to us.
Another right of citizenship that Donaldson and Kymlicka identify is the 
right to political agency: the right to have some say over shaping the policies 
and rules of the political community (101-103). Once again, it is hard to see 
why this right should be denied to wild animals. Donaldson and Kymlicka 
recognise that given the limited moral and rational capacities of animals, 
there are difficulties in conceiving of any animal enjoying the right to politi-
cal agency. However, they point out —quite rightly in my view— that these 
difficulties are not insurmountable. After all, their interests can be repre-
sented by proxies or “collaborators” in much the same way as the interests of 
children and the severely mentally disabled are included in the policy-mak-
ing process (104). But it is unclear why representatives of wild and liminal 
animals should not also feed into the political process in this way. For once 
we recognise that the interests of wild animals count both morally and polit-
ically, it seems only reasonable to let wild animals have some say —through 
their representatives— over the shaping of our political goals and policies. 
In fact, one of the reasons Donaldson and Kymlicka believe political agency 
to be so important for domesticated animals, is because of the dangers of in-
visibility: if absent from the policy making process, it is all too easy for these 
animals not to be shown the concern they are due (113). But of course these 
dangers of invisibility are even more acute for wild animals since they live 
apart from us. As such, awarding rights of political agency to wild animals 
seems absolutely necessary on Donaldson and Kymlicka’s own reasoning.
It again might be objected that letting wild animals have this kind of 
voice is a step too far. Sticking with the overall analogy employed previously, 
wouldn’t this be akin to a state letting foreigners have the vote in its elec-
tions? No, it would not. As Donaldson and Kymlicka themselves point out, 
political agency can come in different forms, and it is not all about having a 
vote (153). Such agency can and does also come in the form of representa-
tion —representation of basic interests and rights— which is a model that is 
perfectly adaptable to wild animals. Given that they possess basic rights, and 
given that these rights are of political concern, it is only proper to grant wild 
animals the right to political agency.
The final general citizenship right Donaldson and Kymlicka identify is the 
right of residency. At first sight this right might well seem to mark off an im-
portant distinction between what is owed to domesticated animals and what 
is owed to all other animals. For Donaldson and Kymlicka seem to be imply-
ing that the right to residency grants domesticated animals a right to live 
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amongst human beings within human societies. Moreover, under their the-
ory, this is not a right shared by other animals: wild animals have no right to 
live amongst us, and human societies can justifiably limit the population of 
incoming liminal animals (227). However, I am not convinced that the right 
to residency really is exclusive to domesticated animals. After all, the right of 
domesticated animals to live within human society must surely derive from 
their interest in a safe and secure environment conducive to their well-being. 
Pet dogs and backyard chickens have an interest in living with humans, for 
example, because they fare better living amongst humans than they would 
fare if thrust out into the wild. But since all animals have a basic interest in a 
safe and secure environment, there is at least a prima facie case for recognis-
ing that they all have a right to the type of residency that protects that inter-
est. Indeed, one of the main reasons Donaldson and Kymlicka think that it is 
useful to assign sovereignty to wild animals is to protect them in their habi-
tats (190). That is, they believe that sovereignty protects what wild animals 
need for a safe and secure environment conducive to their well-being; sov-
ereignty protects their right to safe and secure residency. The universality of 
the right to safe and secure residency is further supported by Donaldson and 
Kymlicka’s claim that if liminal animals end up living within human societies 
—having evaded our attempts to exclude them, say— then they should be 
allowed to stay (228). No doubt they gain this right because they too end up 
being safer and more secure from living amongst human beings. But surely 
the lesson to be drawn from this is that all sentient animals share this same 
fundamental right to safe and secure residency, irrespective of whether they 
are domesticated, liminal or wild. Of course, precisely what provides safe 
and secure residency differs amongst animals, depending on their capacities 
and interests. For some animals, the right will amount to a right to live in our 
homes, for others it will amount to a right to live in protected forests, for still 
others it will be tracts of wilderness, and so on. The crucial point is that the 
basic right is universal, and the implications of that right are delineated by 
the particular interests of the animal in question.
As stated above, Donaldson and Kymlicka do not only provide an account 
of the general citizenship rights of animals, but also usefully discuss some 
practical implications of their citizenship theory. These implications amount 
to an account of more specific rights possessed by domesticated animals. One 
such right is the right to protection from predation (132). This right seems to 
provide a compelling example of a right that it is not appropriate to assign to 
wild animals on the basis that it would seem to entail the bizarre obligation 
to segregate predators from prey animals, disrupt natural food cycles, and in 
effect “police” nature. However, the right to protection from predation is ef-
fectively a derivative of the right to life, one of the universal animal rights rec-
ognised by Donaldson and Kymlicka themselves. Given that they recognise 
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that wild prey animals possess the right to life, does this then mean that they 
must also be committed to protecting wild prey animals from predation? Not 
necessarily. For it is plausible to think of the right to life as both abstract and 
prima facie. It is abstract in the sense that it requires further specification be-
fore we can know what it amounts to for any individual; and it is prima facie 
in the sense that it is defeasible and might not be grounded in all situations 
for all individuals.4 On this understanding, what the right to life amounts to 
and whether it translates into a concrete right in any particular situation is 
dependent on context and requires an assessment of all relevant factors. So 
perhaps Donaldson and Kymlicka might acknowledge the right to life of wild 
prey animals, but conclude that it does not amount to a concrete right to 
protection from predation, all things considered, precisely because of their 
lack of close relations with us. I, however, believe that this is the wrong con-
clusion. For when all relevant interests and factors are properly considered, 
it is evident that the right to life of non-domesticated animals does some-
times entail the concrete right to protection from predation.
Even if the idea that wild animals have a right to protection from preda-
tion might seem absurd at first sight, we do in fact already recognise such 
rights for many wild animals. For example, we protect wild animals from 
predation when we impose restrictions and bans on the human hunting of 
wild animals, such as the ban on whaling: human predation is a form of pre-
dation after all. Furthermore, many believe that the liminal animals such 
as birds, mice and rabbits which are frequently targeted by our pet cats and 
dogs, merit rights to protection. Since we know that our pets do not need to 
conduct these kills to survive, and since we can take quite simple measures 
such as fitting collars, storing food securely and so on to prevent such kills, 
there are certainly weighty reasons for pet-owners to prevent such predatory 
harms (Sapontzis 1987: 232). Finally, there are also scenarios where many 
believe it obligatory to intervene to prevent “overabundant” predators from 
killing rare wild prey —as illustrated by the trapping of mink in the UK for 
the sake of water voles (Morelle 2011).5
The point here is not to claim that all of the examples of current practice 
outlined above are justifiable. No, the point is simply that sometimes, when 
all relevant factors are considered, the prima facie right to life of wild animals 
can and does amount to a concrete right to protection from predation. Of 
course, in most situations this concrete right to protection for wild animals 
4. On abstract rights, see Dworkin (1977: 98). On prima facie rights, see Vlastos (1962: 31-
72), and Cochrane (forthcoming 2013).
5. Of course, it has to be noted that in this example the mink are killed. However, relo-
cating them to a sanctuary would obviously be a more just way of preventing these predatory 
harms.
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will not be established. For one, the burdens of the corresponding duties will 
often be too demanding: we are not in a situation where we can intervene ef-
fectively for the sake of wild prey animals at little cost to ourselves. Moreover, 
consideration of the interests of the predator animals themselves, as well as 
other animals such as scavengers, who depend on such kills, will often count 
against the establishment of the right. Nevertheless, these conclusions are 
properly made through a consideration of all the relevant factors and inter-
ests at stake, and not simply by appeal to whether the animal belongs to a 
group that lives “here” or “out there”.
3.  PRIVILEGING THE RIGHTS OF DOMESTICATED ANIMALS
The previous section argued that group-based theories of rights, which dif-
ferentiate rights according to relational position, are vulnerable to the prob-
lem of failing to extend to outsider groups their just entitlements. Of course, 
one way in which outsiders may be denied their just entitlements is through 
privileging the rights of “insider” groups. Granting too much weight to the 
rights of those close to us, after all, leaves fewer resources to secure the rights 
of those further away.6 Once again, I think that this problem is evident in the 
theory of animal rights presented in Zoopolis. This section considers Don-
aldson and Kymlicka’s discussion of the right to healthcare in order to illus-
trate this claim.
Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that the right to healthcare is a basic right 
of citizenship in most contemporary societies, and is a right that should be 
extended to domesticated animals. Crucially, they also believe that it is a 
right that should not be attributed to wild animals (142-143). I am not so 
sure about this conclusion. First, it is unclear why the right to healthcare is 
inappropriate for non-domesticated animals. After all, given the powerful 
interest that all sentient animals have in being healthy, it is certainly plau-
sible that the right to health is at least a prima facie right enjoyed by them all. 
However, what that right amounts to in any particular situation will depend 
on an evaluation of all the morally relevant factors at stake. Crucially, at least 
in some situations, wild animals can and ought to be granted a concrete 
right to healthcare. For one thing, sometimes identifying and reducing the 
health problems of wild and liminal animals will not be particularly onerous. 
For example, it could just involve dropping a chemical in their waterhole to 
save them from a slow and painful death. Given that their basic interests 
count for something, as Donaldson and Kymlicka accept, then if all else is 
6. This is a version of what Samuel Scheffler has called the “distributive objection” to spe-
cial responsibilities (Scheffler 1997: 189-209). 
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equal and no harmful side-effects will result, it is surely incumbent upon us 
to take such action.
But even if it is accepted that all sentient animals do possess this uni-
versal right to healthcare, it could still be maintained that the right of do-
mesticated animals generates weightier duties for some agents than that of 
wild animals. Their close relations with us, Donaldson and Kymlicka would 
presumably argue, establish special and more stringent obligations on our 
part. However, there is a powerful argument to suggest that many domesti-
cated animals in fact have a weaker claim to a share of health spending from 
the public purse than do wild animals.7 For example, companion animals 
have particular human individuals —their owners— who are responsible for 
both their existence and their well-being. As such, it is perfectly legitimate 
to argue that when all relevant interests are considered, these responsible 
individuals should take the burden of their health costs, rather than the pub-
lic at large. Furthermore, since wild animals do not have particular humans 
with responsibilities for their existence and well-being, they arguably have a 
stronger claim on public funds.
To avoid misunderstandings, my claim is not that all wild animals neces-
sarily have a greater claim to public health spending than do domesticated 
animals. My point is rather to show that Donaldson and Kymlicka’s privileg-
ing of the rights of the group “domesticated animals” is illegitimate. When 
all things are considered, including a full evaluation of all the relevant in-
terests at stake, not only can wild animals sometimes be assigned the right 
to healthcare, but sometimes it will be a right that is stronger than that pos-
sessed by some domesticated animals.
4.  IDENTIFYING AND VALUING WILD ANIMAL COMMUNITIES
The previous sections claimed that the theory of animal rights presented 
in Zoopolis is vulnerable to two related charges that have been levelled at 
group-differentiated theories of rights: that they can deny outsiders their 
just entitlements, and can unfairly privilege the rights of insiders. This sec-
tion discusses two further objections that both relate to the nature of the 
groups that should form the basis of these differential attributions of rights. 
An initial “identification objection” concerns the problem of locating mean-
ingful groups to which rights can be attached (Brown 2009: 130). A further 
“valuation objection” concerns the assumption that these groups are dis-
crete, homogenous entities that ought to be valued and preserved as they 
exist presently (Waldron 1995: 109). This section presses both objections to 
7. Thanks to Paula Casal for making this point to me.
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Zoopolis by exploring the problems faced with attributing sovereign rights to 
“wild animal communities”.
Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that we ought to think about our interac-
tions with animals living in the wild as akin to a relationship between distinct 
self-governing communities (168). So while we have duties to respect the 
universal moral rights of wild animals, we also have duties to respect their 
sovereign rights of self-determination. While this does not mean that we can 
never interfere in the lives of wild animals —certain natural catastrophes and 
the like can justify limited policies of assistance— it does mean that any such 
interventions must only be undertaken in order to restore the autonomous 
functioning of those communities (180-183).
In the first place, it is necessary to ask whether we can meaningfully iden-
tify those wild animal communities to whom Donaldson and Kymlicka be-
lieve sovereignty ought to be applied. Perhaps the first thing that comes to 
mind when we imagine a “wild animal community” to whom sovereignty 
might be attributed is a social group of a single species of animals residing 
on a fixed piece of territory. Unfortunately, and as Donaldson and Kymlicka 
themselves acknowledge, this picture of a wild animal community will not 
work. For one, any piece of territory is likely to involve a great number of 
different species of animals, all of whom cannot claim the same rights of 
self-determination over it. Moreover, wild animals have no knowledge of or 
respect for defined borders, and will continually cross over them. As such, 
and as Donaldson and Kymlicka agree, if a community of wild animals is to 
be identifiable, it will have to refer to a mixed species group whose territorial 
boundaries are fluid (191).
However, even if such discrete groups of wild animals can be identified, 
it is unclear that they constitute a “political community”. Political commu-
nities are clearly not natural entities, but have instead been constructed by 
humans to facilitate shared social enterprises and to represent and main-
tain certain feelings of affiliation.8 But when we consider any mixed species 
group of wild animals, it is hard to see how they fit into this understanding 
of a community. After all, there is not much evidence of shared enterprise or 
feelings of affiliation within groups of wild animals. Indeed, many animals 
are in perpetual violent conflict with one another, as illustrated by the re-
lations between predator and prey animals. Furthermore, since many wild 
animals are solitary, and do not live in social groups, it is very hard to see 
how these animals can meaningfully fit into a conception of a cooperative 
group bonded by feelings of attachment.
8. For a classic account of human communities as ideological constructions, see Ander-
son (2006).
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Attempting to avoid this type of objection, Donaldson and Kymlicka em-
ploy a much looser understanding of what comprises a political community, 
which jettisons, for example, any assumption that there is much cooperation 
or even interaction among members, or that there is any sort of sentimental 
attachment to the community. Instead, their claim is that these wild animals 
must merely be “competent”: “What matters for sovereignty is the ability to 
respond to the challenges that a community faces, and to provide a social 
context in which its individual members can grow and flourish” (175).
It is extremely unclear, however, whether any group of wild animals can 
actually be considered competent in the sense just stated.9 After all, different 
animals require quite different things to successfully respond to challenges, 
or to grow and flourish. Moreover, the competency of some individuals in a 
group will necessarily be to the detriment of others in the group —and may 
even involve the killing and consumption of others! If, for example, we con-
sider the wild animals existing on the African savannah, it is hard to know 
what the shared collective competency of the group considered as a whole 
could be. The competencies of the cheetah, of the hyenas, of the gazelles, 
of the vulture, of locusts, and so on, are all very different, and the compe-
tency of one will often be to the detriment of another. In order to claim that 
a group must be left to autonomously run its own affairs, the group needs to 
have its “own affairs”, and yet it is hard to see what this may be in the case of 
groups of wild animals.
Of course, it might be responded that wild animal groups do have a 
shared sense of competency, in spite of their conflicting interests. For ex-
ample, some environmentalists might claim that wild animal groups have 
a collective interest in something like the maintenance of ecosystem flour-
ishing.10 The problem with this, however, is that it moves us well beyond the 
type of competency that Donaldson and Kymlicka see as important for the 
attribution of sovereignty. For recall that they are concerned with competen-
cy that allows individuals to grow and flourish (175). And ecosystem flour-
ishing cannot plausibly be claimed to allow all individual animals to grow 
and flourish: for in many instances, a flourishing ecosystem depends on and 
entails the suffering and death of certain individual animals.
Even if we assume that this problem can be overcome and that we can 
identify discrete groups of wild animals who constitute communities, we 
9. For a fuller and extremely valuable discussion of this point, see Oscar Horta’s contribu-
tion to this volume.
10. This idea is not explicitly endorsed in Zoopolis itself, although the authors do get 
close to endorsing this idea in their discussion of predation and starvation in relation to “failed 
states” (176). They also claim that “ecological viability” is part of their understanding of sover-
eignty (191). 
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still face the so-called “valuational objection”. Part of the grounds that Don-
aldson and Kymlicka give for granting sovereignty to wild animals is to pro-
tect these communities’ interests in autonomy and non-interference (173). 
Zoopolis claims that wild animal communities possess such interests be-
cause they are competent in managing their own affairs and have an evident 
antipathy to human intervention (177). However, there are good reasons to 
question whether animal communities really do have an interest in non-
interference to preserve their current form. Indeed, it seems highly unlikely 
that significant portions of these groups such as prey animals, those riddled 
with disease, or those suffering terribly from starvation, would possess such 
an interest. It is much more likely, in fact, that wild animals such as these 
actually possess an interest in their community changing in ways to their 
benefit, even with human intervention. To be sure, this is not to say that they 
are consciously interested in and desire such changes. This is highly unlikely, 
and is illustrated by the fact that nearly all wild animals will resist any form 
of interference from human beings. Nonetheless, few accounts of interests 
simply equate them with subjective desires, because it is clear that individu-
als of all species can be mistaken about what is in their own interests.11 As 
such, it is perfectly possible that wild animals have an interest in certain 
goods that they actively resist, and it is also possible that a good many have 
an interest in their communities changing via the actions of human beings.12 
At the very least, it is extremely hard to make sense of the idea that those wild 
animals who suffer terribly and face death directly as a result of the current 
conditions of their community also have an interest in the preservation of 
that community in its current form.
It is also worth pointing out that preserving these wild animal communi-
ties as they exist presently will not be secured simply by following general 
policies of non-intervention. Donaldson and Kymlicka are well aware that 
the autonomous functioning of sovereign animal communities can be threat-
ened not just by humans, but also by natural disasters such as earthquakes 
and the like, and thus allow for limited interventions to restore autonomy in 
such cases (181). However, another important type of natural disaster that 
wild animal communities face derives from other wild animal communities, 
such as their predators or territorial rivals. One compelling example of this, 
of course, is genocidal chimpanzee wars (Mitani, Watts and Amsler 2010: 
507). A more mundane example is the simple process whereby population 
density and other factors continually drive species from one territory to an-
other in the normal process of biological dispersal. Both such cases inevita-
11. For a useful discussion of the objective and subjective elements of “interests” see 
Swanton (1980: 83-101).
12. Of course, this does not mean that humans are always obliged to act on that interest.
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bly involve the transgression of one sovereign animal community by mem-
bers of another. From the perspective of Zoopolis, such transgressions could 
be described as wars of invasion and self-defence. What seems clear, then, 
is that preserving wild animal communities as they exist presently through 
granting them sovereignty will demand far more from human beings than 
Donaldson and Kymlicka admit. Effectively, it will mean that we will be re-
quired to police the relations between wild animal communities, which may 
require a just war theory for animals, at least concerning the just assistance 
of the invaded group.
5.  CONCLUSION: FROM ZOOPOLIS TO COSMOZOOPOLIS
This paper has argued that the theory of animal rights presented in Zoopolis is 
vulnerable to certain critiques that are levelled at all group-differentiated the-
ories of rights. In the first place, such theories can deny outsider groups their 
just entitlements. I have argued that Donaldson and Kymlicka mistakenly fail 
to extend to wild animals rights they grant to domesticated animals, such 
as the rights to political concern, political agency, residency and protection 
from predation. Secondly and relatedly, such theories can also unfairly privi-
lege the rights of insider groups. I have argued that Donaldson and Kymlicka 
grant too much weight to the rights of domesticated animals, for example to 
healthcare, neglecting the fact that many companion animals have owners 
who are responsible for their lives and well-being. Finally, such theories also 
have problems in identifying the relevant groups that form the basis for dif-
ferentiated rights, and in explaining why they are valuable. I have argued that 
the theory of Zoopolis fails to offer a plausible account of who wild animal 
communities are, and why they ought to be preserved as they exist presently.
As I hope to have shown, we cannot neatly group animals into discrete 
categories —domesticated, wild and liminal— each with their own distinc-
tive entitlements. The rights of any particular animal are better determined 
via a cosmopolitan perspective that attaches rights to individuals primarily 
according to their capacities and interests, as opposed to their membership 
in different groups.
Donaldson and Kymlicka might respond that group membership is not 
intended to replace interests and capacities as a basis for rights, but to com-
plement an interest-based theory of either human or animal rights which 
will otherwise be underdetermined, and insensitive to the very different 
types of obligations we have to different individuals. My view is that a theory 
grounded primarily in the capacities and interests of individual rights-bear-
ers can be attuned to the different obligations we often have to animals. The 
universal rights of individuals are only abstract and prima facie. They need 
to be further specified into concrete rights by making an all things consid-
140 Alasdair Cochrane
LEAP, 1 (2013)
ered judgement of all the relevant factors and interests at stake. Importantly, 
such a process will inevitably recognise that different individuals are often 
owed quite different things. In my view, this perspective provides the best 
way to understand human rights, and it is the best basis for a theory of rights 
for all sentient creatures.13
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